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Abstract 
The aim of this study is to evaluate the relationship between foreign aid and taxe revenue in Morocco 
by using the Error Correction Model Following the approach of Johansen to jointly capture the 
long-run relationship and short-run dynamics between aid and tax revenue. Other variables such as the 
shares of agriculture and industry in GDP, exports, imports and GDP are also included in the model. 
The results indicate that the direct effect of foreign aid on tax revenue is insignificant in the short term, 
but it becomes negative and significant in the long term. 
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1. Introduction 
Aid can be used in theory to improve tax collection, but it can also act as a deterrent to a country’s tax 
system. In terms of official development assistance, OECD statistics put Morocco in the 7th place 
among beneficiary countries on the African continent, accounting for 4% of total ODA to Africa (Note 
1). Indeed, since the early 1980’s, the international community has devoted about $ 42.82 billion in 
official development assistance to Morocco (WDI, 2018), an average of $ 1.16 billion per year. On the 
other hand, tax revenues are estimated at 188958.24 MAD in 2016, or 18.6% of Moroccan GDP 
(Ministry of Economy and Finance of Morocco, 2018). The product of the VAT is the first source of 
financing in Morocco. Between 2008 and 2016, it accounted for 36.3% of all tax revenues instead of 
27.5% over the period 2000-2007. 
This study aims to identify the nature of the impact of aid on tax revenues in Morocco. This question is 
important because aid could fill the lack of resources, due to the insufficiency of the national resources, 
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notably fiscal, and support the financing of the various public expenditures to promote an inclusive 
growth. Or else, it could discourage tax collection and/or hinder economic growth. 
Our study is inspired from numerous studies of Gupta et al. (2004) and Morrissey et al. (2015), but we 
use in our analysis the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) to jointly capture the long-run 
relationship and short-run dynamics between foreign aid and tax revenue in Morocco. 
This work is organized as follows. The first step will be to review on the theoretical links existing 
between aid and tax revenue. Secondly, we will arrive at a simple methodology to identify the nature of 
the empirical link between different variables. This will allow us to draw useful information in terms of 
interrelations between variables and in terms of economic policy requirements, including aid and fiscal 
policies. 
 
2. Literature Review 
A significant number of economists and international organizations pay particular attention to the 
effects of aid on taxation in developing countries. For example, Benedek et al. (2012) find that aid has a 
negative impact on tax collection. Other studies, however, find that aid has a positive effect, including 
Clist and Morrissey (2011), Carter (2013) and Clist (2014). Ouattara (2006) even finds that the 
relationship is not significant. Thus, recipient countries can use the aid for purposes not envisaged by 
the donor (Morrissey, 2015). 
2.1 Foreign Aid and Tax Revenue 
Some authors believe that an increase in aid flows would reduce the government’s incentives to 
maintain or increase its fiscal effort. 
Using a panel data set of 107 developing countries over the period 1970-2000 for their empirical 
analysis, Gupta et al. (2004) find a negative relationship between aid and tax revenues and argue that 
the composition of aid is important, with loans that must be repaid, encouraging collection, but 
discourages tax effort. 
Benedek et al. (2012) support the existence of a negative relationship between aid and tax revenue 
using a dataset covering 118 countries for the period 1980-2009. Overall, the results show a negative 
association between official development assistance (ODA) and domestic tax revenue. For the authors, 
the composition of net ODA is important; ODA grants are associated with lower incomes, while ODA 
loans are not. Thus, they indicate that the impact of ODA donations on tax revenue seems to weaken 
over time. Also, the relationship between ODA donations and certain taxes (VAT, income taxes and 
excise taxes) is also negative, except in the case of trade taxes. 
Using a new source of tax revenue data in an annual panel Morrissey et al. (2015) replicate some of the 
basic results of Gupta et al. (2004) and Benedek et al. (2012), namely that net aid has a negative 
coefficient on tax revenues. When disaggregating aid the authors cannot reproduce their results; they 
find a positive rather than negative effect of grants when significant, while loans are almost always 
insignificant.  
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Paul Clist (2014) re-studies the contribution of Benedek et al. (2012), and considers that the fears of 
negative effects of aid appear unjustified and can be explained by the inappropriate use of data or 
problems of endogeneity. In his view, aid has a relatively small, perhaps positive influence on domestic 
tax revenues. Thus, the results of the study by Benedek et al. (2012), which reports the differential 
effects of donations and loans on tax revenues, can not be replicated. In addition, they suffer from 
serious problems resulting from a dependent variable composed of several incompatible data sources 
and definitions. 
Attila et al. (2009) tried to identify the impact of official development assistance on tax transition in 
developing countries. After having constructed qualitative indicators of fiscal transition and envisaged 
the mechanisms by which ODA affects the adoption of a tax transition reform, the authors used a 
nonlinear probability model for assess the probability of adoption of a tax transition reform and identify 
the effect of ODA. From this model, estimated from a sample of 106 developing countries over the 
period 1980-2005, ODA has a positive impact on the implementation of tax transition reforms. 
2.2 Foreign Aid and Public Expenditures 
One of the main channels through which foreign aid influences economic growth is its impact on the 
public expenditure of the recipient country. Numerous studies are concerned about whether 
expenditures in the sector to which aid is intended really increase according to the amount of aid. For 
example, does spending on the education sector increase with the amount that donors allocate to 
education? This concerns the composition of public expenditure. 
A study by Ouattara (2006), using panel data series for foreign aid over the period 1980-2000, suggests 
that aid has a positive effect on public investment. The results also show that aid does not lead to an 
increase in non-development expenditures (wages, salaries and subsidies); but induces an increase in 
public spending on development (health and education). McGillivray and Morrissey (2001) focus on 
the fiscal behavior of the public sector. They argued that aid is associated with an increase in public 
spending. According to them, the distribution between the different categories of public expenditure 
varies from one country to another, but in principle all categories of public expenditure can increase. 
McGillivray and Morrissey (2001) focus on the fiscal behavior of the public sector. They argued that 
aid tends to be associated with government spending increases in excess of the value of the aid. 
According to them, the distribution between the different categories of public expenditure varies from 
one country to another, but in principle all categories of public expenditure can increase. They find that 
aid can also have effects on tax effort and borrowing. 
Celasun and Walliser (2008) suggest that the lack of predictability of aid flows has an asymmetrical 
impact on the composition of public expenditure. In the event of an unexpected fall in aid flows, 
governments are reducing investment, while an unexpected increase in aid flows tends to increase 
consumption. Thus, unpredictable aid flows tend to shift public spending from investment to 
consumption. 
Some authors attribute the ineffectiveness of aid to fungibility, since aid funds are redirected from 
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investment to public consumption. There are two elements to this argument. The first is that there is 
fungibility and, in particular, that capital expenditure increases by less than the amount of aid. The 
proof is strong if one limits oneself to categorical fungibility studies (World Bank, 1998). The second 
argument is that public consumption expenditure has a negative impact on growth (e.g., Burnside & 
Dollar, 1997). In this case, the distinction is usually made between productive expenditures and 
non-productive expenditures, with the assumption that only the first promote economic growth.  
According to McGillivray and Morrissey (2001), fungibility studies have been granted too much 
attention; these are narrowly focussed on the composition of government spending, and are not 
sufficiently informative about fiscal behaviour. Fiscal response studies are of greater relevance, as they 
attempt to address the effects of aid on behaviour regarding total spending, tax revenue and borrowing. 
 
3. Methodology 
The methodological approach will first be to define the variables involved in the study, then to explain 
the instrument of analysis linked to the verification of the empirical relationship between foreign aid and 
tax revenue in Morocco. 
3.1 Data and Variables 
The choice of variables is based on existing literature of Gupta et al. (2004) and Morrissey et al. (2015). 
In fact, seven variables are defined for examining the empirical link between foreign aid and tax 
revenues. The dependent variable is the tax revenue as a percentage of GDP (Tax_R). Foreign aid 
(aid)represented here by the official development assistance, the level of income (GDP), the share of 
agriculture (AGR) in GDP, the share of industry (IND) and trade/GDP ratios for imports (M) and 
exports (X) are all included in the model. 
The data are extracted from the World Development Indicator (WDI) of the World Bank database 
(2018). The data used are annual and cover the period from 1980 to 2016. The tool used to process this 
data is Eviews 6.0, a statistical software package used mainly for time series. 
3.2 Model 
The analysis estimates the standard tax structure equation (1) following Gupta et al. (2004) and 
Morrissey et al. (2015). Therefore,our model corresponds to the following specification: 
2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7_Tax R GDP AGR IND M X aid aid                   
(1) 
Our econometric study consists in testing a VECM model linking aid to tax revenue. This method 
allows us to reveal jointly the long run and short run relationships between variables. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Unit Root Test 
The examination of stationarity is aprerequisite before any treatment of the time series in order to avoid 
spurious regressions. It is therefore necessary to determine the order of integration of the time series 
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using the Augmented Dickey Fuller test (ADF). This test is carried out under three possible model 
specifications, with constant and trend, with constant, and with no constant nor trend. We obtain the 
results summarized in the following table:  
 
Table 1. ADF Unit Root Test Results 
Variables 
Model 1 (Note 2) Model 2 (Note 3) Model 3 (Note 4) order of 
integration Level First Difference Level First Difference Level First Difference 
Tax_R -2.641778 -5.341841* -1.189266 -5.424573* 0.887614 -5.360821* I(1) 
GDP -3.072557 -4.887087* 0.026746 -5.033595* 0.703854 -4.091889* I(1) 
AGR -4.530945* -12.67677* -2.027098 -12.75048* -0.221298 -12.94606* I(1) 
IND -3.614525* -5.665848* -2.140880 -6.629646* -1.463557 -6.414503* I(1) 
M -2.102692 -7.047671* -1.149360 -7.033940* 0.526260 -7.075566* I(1) 
X -2.930181 -7.665380* -1.347705 -7.762239* 0.872857 -7.613006* I(1) 
aid -1.187732 -4.808913* -1.710095 -5.157902* -1.443760 -5.167329* I(1) 
aid² -0.296425 -6.117460* -2.309729 -0.381297 -2.790444* -0.665231 I(1) 
*Indicates that the coefficient is significant at 5% probability level. 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
 
As shown in Table 1, the results imply that the variables in the model represent DS processes at the 
level. The tests applied to the first differences reject the null hypothesis of the unit root with the 
threshold of 5% (t-statistic > critical value). Since the first differences are stationary, the variables are 
integrated to the same order (I (1)), which means we can proceed to the Johansen’s co integration. 
4.1 Lag Selection 
Determining the number of lags is an essential step because it gives us the average duration of response 
variables. The number of lags depends on the size of the selected sample. It significantly influences the 
estimation. The number of lags to be used for applying the Johansen test is determined by calculating 
the Akaike (AIC) and Schwarz (SC) information criteria for lags ranging from 1 to 3. There are other 
criteria to determine the optimal number of lags like the Hannan-Quin criterion and the Final Prediction 
Error, which are based on the same principle. The results are shown in the following table: 
 
Table 2. Selecting the Number of Lags 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 -437.5358 NA 33.28506 26.20799 26.56713 -26.33047 
1 -276.3174 237.0858* 0.121183* 20.48926 23.72155* 21.59157 
2 -205.8889 70.42855 0.164803 20.11111 26.21655 22.19324 
3 -103.1792 54.37570 0.203692 17.89407* 26.81266 20.89603* 
* indicates lag order selected by the criterion. 
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We find that the minimum of the Akaike criterion corresponds to p = 3 while the Schwarz criterion 
corresponds to p = 1. In order to complete our test, we will compare the FPE criteria, and HQ and the 
Log-Liklelihood. The results obtained in Table 2 indicate that the optimal number of lags to be retained 
is 1. Indeed, since this study uses a small sample, with annual long data, so selecting more lags would 
reduce the degrees of freedom. In fact, the optimal lag used is lag 1for the efficient results in terms of 
statistical significance in the vector equations, and the VECM estimates. 
4.2 Johansen Co-Integration Test 
After determining the optimum lags (1 lag), we can then establish the number of equilibrium relations 
existing between the four variables. The Johansen co-integration test is performed on a system of seven 
variables (Tax_R, GDP, AGR, IND, M, X and aid). In order to carry out the test it is necessary to 
perform the Trace and the Maximum Eigenvalue tests synthesized in the following table: 
 
Table 3. Johansen Co-Integration Test Results 
Null hypothesis 
(H 0) 
Trace test for the cointegrating rank 
Results 
of H0 
Maximum-Eigenvalue test for the 











value at 5% 
None 0.822579 201.3581 159.5297 Rejected 0.822579 60.52314 52.36261 Rejected 
At most 1 0.731617 149.8349 125.6154 Rejected 0.731617 46.03697 46.23142 Accepted 
At most 2 0.664180 103.7980 95.75366 Rejected 0.664180 38.19130 40.07757 Accepted 
At most 3 0.585526 65.60666 69.81889 Accepted 0.585526 30.82610 33.87687 Accepted 
At most 4 0.343067 34.78056 47.85613 Accepted 0.343067 14.70604 27.58434 Accepted 
Conclusion 
Trace test indicates 3 cointegrating equations at 
the 0.05 level 
Max-Eigen test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at 
the 0.05 level  
Source: authors’ calculations. 
 
The results of the trace and Maximum Eigenvalue tests show that there is indeed a cointegration 
between variables because the null hypothesis of absence of cointegration is rejected at the 5% level. 
Table 3 shows that the trace test indicates 3 cointegration equations (65.60666 < 69.81889) while the 
Max-Eigen test indicates 1 cointegration equation at the 5% threshold (46.03697 < 46.23142). We 
admit that there is one cointegration relation. 
4.3 Model Estimation 
The estimation of the VECM gives a negative and significant coefficient of Error correction term 
(-0.285) of the co-integration equation. This coefficient represents the speed of adjustment to long-run 
equilibrium (Table 4). 
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Table 4. Estimate of the Cointegration Vector 
The coefficients of the long-term relationship 
Tax_R (-1) GDP(-1) AGR(-1) IND(-1) M(-1) X(-1) aid(-1) aid² (-1) c 
 -2.7510 -1.2071 0.6349 0.0934 -1.134 1.1231 -0.3734  
1.000000 [-1.222] [-5.429] [1.605] [0.825] [-4.85] [1.105] [-2.753] 30.88 
The coefficients of error correction mechanism 
-0.2852 -0.0054 0.4097 -0.06965 -0.1252 0.0993 0.193 1.861  
[-3.4849] [-0.775] [2.5817] [-0.6946] [-0.361] [0.537] [1.819] [2.315]  
Source: authors’ calculations. 
 
4.3.1 VECM Long Run Estimates 
As Tax_R, GDP, AGR, IND, M, X, aid and aid²are cointegrated, the long-run relationship may have the 
following form: 
Tax_R = 2.75* GDP + 1.21* AGR - 0.63 * IND - 0.09 * M+ 1.13*X - 1.12 aid + 0.37aid² 
- 30.88                                     (2) 
In the long term, aid has a negative impact on tax revenue. Indeed, an increase of 1% of Official 
Development Assistance leads to a loss of approximately 1.12% of tax revenue. Similarly, the share of 
industry in GDP and import shave a negative effect on tax revenue in the long term. On the other hand, 
the results of our model show that GDP, the share of agriculture in economy and exports have a 
positive impact on tax revenue. 
4.3.2 VECM Short Run Estimates 
The multivariate analysis conclude that there is no significant relationship between aid and tax revenue 
in the short run and with one-year delay. Also, the error correction term is significantly negative and 
equal to -0.285, indicating that the variable of tax revenue adjusts at a rate of 28% relative to its 
equilibrium level following any shock from exogenous variables, and the shock is entirely reabsorbed 
after one year (Appendix A). 
 
5. Discussion 
The results of our study vary according to the two time horizons. In the short run, the direct effect of 
foreign aid on tax revenue is insignificant. However, in the long run, the effect becomes significant and 
negative. 
The analysis of the short-term parameters of our model shows that aid has no significant effect on tax 
revenues. Using four-year averaged panel data, Morrissey et al. (2014) also find no consistent robust 
relationship between aid, in total or disaggregated into grants and loans, and tax performance. Where 
they do find significant coefficients these are positive for net aid and for grants, whereas for loans they 
are generally negative (Morrisey et al., 2015). 
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We also note that aid has a negative impact on the share of agriculture in the economy in the short run. 
Also, the share of agriculture in GDP is significant with a negative effect in the short term. In fact, an 
increase of 1% of the share of agriculture is equivalent to decrease of 0.36% of tax revenue (Appendix 
A). These results can be interpreted by the fact that, in the short term, aid acts indirectly on the tax 
revenue through the channel of the share of agriculture in GDP. However, the impact of the share of 
agriculture becomes positive in the long term. Indeed, an increase of 1% of the share of agriculture in 
GDP is equivalent to an improvement of 1.21% of the tax revenues. 
In the long term, the impact of aid on tax revenue is negative. In this case, the results show that an 
increase of 1% of foreign aid contributes to a decrease of 1.12% of tax revenue. This result is consistent 
with the findings of Gupta et al. (2004). The argument of this finding is that aid discourages tax 
collection because the security provided by « easy » revenue from donors reduces the urgency for 
collecting domestic revenue (Brautigam & Knack, 2004; Gupta et al., 2004). Morrisey et al. (2015) 
demonstrate that although they can replicate the negative coefficient on aid variables in a tax revenue 
regression that is often claimed to show that aid reduces tax effort. 
Moreover, our model shows that foreign aid has no significant impact on GDP, imports and exports in 
Morocco. This should lead to a reflection on the need to reorient aid in order to optimize its impact on 
the tax revenue according to the nature of the Moroccan tax system. 
 
6. Conclusion  
The purpose of this study is to highlight the nature of the effect of aid on tax revenue in Morocco. We 
use a vector error correction model (VECM) to detect jointly the dynamics of short term (represented 
by the variables in first difference) and long term (represented by the variables in level). We find that 
there is no direct impact of aid on tax revenue in the short run but aid has a negative effect on the share 
of agriculture in the economy. Also, the share of agriculture in GDP is significant with a negative effect 
in the short term. We may admet that through the channel of the share of agriculture in GDP that aid 
influences negatively the tax revenue in the short term. 
In the long term, the results suggest that foreign aid has a negative impact on tax revenue. Also, we find 
that raising the share of agriculture in GDP increases the tax revenues. 
It must be noted that the quality of data and statistical tools play a determining role in the relevance of 
the results. According to Morrissey et al. (2015), one of the major challenges to the empirical analysis 
of the relationship between aid and tax revenues is the quality and availability of data, in particular that 
of general government and tax revenues. 
The negative impact of aid in the long-term will raise the question of the quality of transmission 
channels. This leads us to reflect on the presence of other variables and transmission channels such as 
the link between aid and the fiscal space in Morocco.  
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Appendix A 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Vector Error Correction Estimates       
Included observations: 35 after adjustments      
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]      
Cointegrating Eq: CointEq1        
TAX_R(-1) 1.000000        
GDP(-1) -2.751031        
 (2.25019)        
 [-1.22258]        
AGR(-1) -1.207120        
 (0.22236)        
 [-5.42878]        
IND(-1) 0.634886        
 (0.39562)        
 [1.60477]        
M(-1) 0.093454        
 (0.11331)        
 [0.82480]        
X(-1) -1.134263        
 (0.23392)        
 [-4.84899]        
AID(-1) 1.123104        
 (1.01596)        
 [1.10546]        
AID2(-1) -0.373435        
 (0.13566)        
 [-2.75282]        
@TREND(80) 0.271807        
 (0.15848)        
 [1.71509]        
C 30.87898        
Error Correction: D(TAX_R) D(GDP) D(AGR) D(IND) D(M) D(X) D(AID) D(AID2) 
CointEq1 -0.285217 -0.005421 0.409674 -0.069658 -0.125257 0.099306 0.192841 1.860874 
 (0.08184) (0.00699) (0.15868) (0.10043) (0.34737) (0.18473) (0.10600) (0.80381) 
 [-3.48490] [-0.77554] [2.58170] [-0.69363] [-0.36059] [0.53757] [1.81928] [2.31506] 
D(TAX_R(-1)) -0.070330 -0.009730 -0.087171 -0.014398 -0.700903 -0.787854 -0.251291 -1.935019 
 (0.20012) (0.01709) (0.38801) (0.24555) (0.84936) (0.45169) (0.25918) (1.96544) 
 [-0.35144] [-0.56930] [-0.22466] [-0.05864] [-0.82521] [-1.74424] [-0.96955] [-0.98452] 
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D(GDP(-1)) 1.864405 0.472925 3.345444 0.778929 0.292722 -0.741635 1.787444 18.11387 
 (2.00704) (0.17141) (3.89139) (2.46271) (8.51840) (4.53008) (2.59940) (19.7118) 
 [0.92893] [2.75902] [0.85970] [0.31629] [0.03436] [-0.16371] [0.68764] [0.91894] 
D(AGR(-1)) -0.358837 -0.014968 -0.311908 -0.069758 -0.272126 -0.440700 0.078912 0.837061 
 (0.10388) (0.00887) (0.20141) (0.12746) (0.44089) (0.23447) (0.13454) (1.02024) 
 [-3.45434] [-1.68715] [-1.54863] [-0.54727] [-0.61722] [-1.87958] [0.58654] [0.82046] 
D(IND(-1)) -0.396068 -0.023897 -0.015381 -0.320229 -0.935306 -0.984801 -0.189650 -1.723537 
 (0.19722) (0.01684) (0.38238) (0.24200) (0.83705) (0.44514) (0.25543) (1.93695) 
 [-2.00826] [-1.41880] [-0.04022] [-1.32329] [-1.11738] [-2.21233] [-0.74249] [-0.88982] 
D(M(-1)) -0.036824 0.004058 -0.010999 -0.049831 -0.194808 -0.129414 0.161490 1.118185 
 (0.07103) (0.00607) (0.13773) (0.08716) (0.30149) (0.16033) (0.09200) (0.69765) 
 [-0.51839] [0.66895] [-0.07986] [-0.57171] [-0.64616] [-0.80717] [1.75535] [1.60279] 
D(X(-1)) 0.084938 0.000553 0.175626 -0.032153 0.662273 0.226544 0.076972 0.938173 
 (0.11165) (0.00954) (0.21648) (0.13700) (0.47389) (0.25201) (0.14461) (1.09659) 
 [0.76073] [0.05794] [0.81127] [-0.23469] [1.39753] [0.89894] [0.53228] [0.85554] 
D(AID(-1)) 0.067200 -0.166813 -1.017418 0.332189 0.559890 2.388582 -0.166121 0.205390 
 (0.81538) (0.06964) (1.58092) (1.00050) (3.46069) (1.84039) (1.05603) (8.00813) 
 [0.08241] [-2.39544] [-0.64356] [0.33202] [0.16179] [1.29786] [-0.15731] [0.02565] 
D(AID2(-1)) -0.040808 0.023729 0.271907 -0.086587 -0.154104 -0.346670 0.002646 -0.147065 
 (0.10367) (0.00885) (0.20099) (0.12720) (0.43998) (0.23398) (0.13426) (1.01813) 
 [-0.39365] [2.68017] [1.35282] [-0.68071] [-0.35025] [-1.48161] [0.01971] [-0.14445] 
C 0.012938 0.026641 -0.088392 -0.201977 0.067124 0.379450 -0.271720 -2.386950 
 (0.17988) (0.01536) (0.34877) (0.22072) (0.76348) (0.40602) (0.23298) (1.76670) 
 [0.07192] [1.73412] [-0.25344] [-0.91506] [0.08792] [0.93457] [-1.16630] [-1.35108] 
R-squared 0.504726 0.476839 0.638546 0.410755 0.165026 0.431682 0.310755 0.360685 
Adj. R-squared 0.326427 0.288502 0.508422 0.198626 -0.135565 0.227088 0.062627 0.130531 
Sum sq. resids 18.83497 0.137381 70.80441 28.35816 339.2872 95.95400 31.59338 1816.786 
S.E. equation 0.867985 0.074130 1.682907 1.065048 3.683950 1.959122 1.124160 8.524754 
F-statistic 2.830788 2.531831 4.907228 1.936350 0.549005 2.109943 1.252399 1.567149 
Log likelihood -38.81927 47.29313 -61.99288 -45.98027 -89.41408 -67.31196 -47.87084 -118.7787 
Akaike AIC 2.789673 -2.131036 4.113879 3.198873 5.680805 4.417827 3.306905 7.358782 
Schwarz SC 3.234058 -1.686651 4.558264 3.643258 6.125190 4.862212 3.751290 7.803167 
Mean dependent 0.178747 0.050345 0.034962 -0.146312 0.294622 0.343803 -0.117372 -0.941950 
S.D. dependent 1.057597 0.087883 2.400292 1.189739 3.457067 2.228417 1.161106 9.142287 
Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 0.044926       
Determinant resid covariance 0.003044       
Log likelihood -295.8986       
Akaike information criterion 21.99421       
Schwarz criterion 25.94923       
 
